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The Fetal Patient and the Unwilling
Mother: A Standard for Judicial
Intervention
For centuries the human fetus has been a "medical recluse."' Until
recently, the advancement of medical knowledge about the fetus was
restrained by a limited ability to observe and study fetal growth and
development in utero z Beginning in the 1960's, however, the fetus
slowly emerged from its gestational hiding place with the advent of
new technological developments that provided practical methods to ex-
amine and analyze fetal characteristics.3 These new techniques ena-
bled physicians for the first time to make prenatal diagnoses of certain
fetal disorders.4 Once prenatal diagnosis became a standard part of
obstetrical care, the potential to treat at least some of these defects also
became a possibility.'
The first important diagnostic tool to appear was amniocentesis 6 -a
procedure that allows identification of some inherited and chromo-
somal abnormalities prior to birth.7 This technique was used primarily
in conjunction with selective abortion to prevent the birth of defective
children.' Standing alone amniocentesis did not offer any significant
treatment possibilities. 9 The development of ultrasound (so-
1. See Harrison, Golbus & Filly, Management of the Fetus with a Correctable Congenital
Defect, 246 J. AM. MED. A. 774, 774 [hereinafter cited as Management of the Fetus].
2. See Nadler, Prenatal Diagnosis, in MODERN PERINATAL MEDICINE 123-125 (1974).
3. See Friedman, Legal Implications ofAmniocentesis, 123 U. PA. L. REv. 92, 95 (1974); W.
Ruddick & W. Wilcox, Operating on the Fetus, 12 HASTINGS CENTER REP., October 1982, at 10,
10. These include amniocentesis, ultrasound, and fetoscopy. See infra notes 6-13. See generally
D. SIGOERS, PRENATAL DIAGNOSIS OF GENETIC DISEASE (1978).
4. Friedman, supra note 3, at 94-96.
5. Amniocentesis is now accepted standard of care for medically indicated pregnancies. See
infra note 193; see also Call v. Kezirian, 135 Cal. App. 3d 189, 194, 185 Cal. Rptr. 103, 105 (1982);
Damme, Controlling Genetic Disease Through Law, 15 U.C. DAVIS L. REv. 801, 834-35 (1982).
6. Amniocentesis, derived from the Greek, means to puncture (kentesis) the membrane (am-
nion) that envelops the fetus. See Friedman, supra note 3, at 95.
7. Id. at 99-102. Amniocentesis, generally performed between the 14th and 16th week of
pregnancy, is accomplished by inserting a needle through the mother's abdominal wall and uterus
into the amnionic sac to withdraw a sample of amniotic fluid. This sample is then analyzed to
detect abnormalities. See J. PRITCHARD & P. MACDONALD, WILLIAMS OBSTErncs 330 (16th ed.
1980) [hereinafter cited as WILLIAMS OBSTETRICS]. This process of analysis can require up to one
month before results are available. See J. HOBBINS & F. WINSBERG, ULTRASONOGRAPHY IN OB-
STETRICS AND GYNECOLOGY 116 (1977).
8. See Friedman, supra note 3, at 94.
9. See Ruddick & Wilcox, supra note 3, at 10; Clewell, Johnson & Meier,, Surgical_4p-
proach to the Treatment of Fetal Hydrocephalus, 306 NEw ENG. J. MED. 1320, 1323 (1982).
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nography)' ° for obstetrical use, however, provided the major techno-
logical means to transform the fetus into a full-fledged patient by
facilitating direct in utero visualization of fetal anatomy."' Until re-
cently, fetal treatment has been nonsurgical in nature.' 2  Advances in
microsurgery, 13 however, coupled with the availability of new drugs,'4
have now enabled surgeons to operate on the fetus. 5 Some examples
of fetal surgery include an intrauterine procedure to correct congenital
hydrocephalus 6 and an extrauterine procedure to alleviate bilateral
congenital hydronephrosis.' 7
Although currently an experimental procedure, the use of fetal sur-
gery is likely to increase as new techniques are developed and existing
procedures become more established.'8 This probable expansion of the
field of fetal surgery has been welcomed by commentators, parents, and
physicians alike because it portends an increasing ability to cope with
10. See generally HOBBINS & WINSBERG, supra note 7; H. THOMPSON & R. BERNSTINE, DI-
AGNOSTIC ULTRASOUND IN CLINICAL OBSTETRICS AND GYNECOLOGY (1978). Ultrasound is a
technique that utilizes high frequency sound waves to transfer an image of the fetus to a television
screen. Ultrasound can establish the number, size and position of the fetus(es) and aids in visuali-
zation of fetal anatomy so that in utero surgery may be performed.
11. See Management of the Fetus, supra note 1, at 777.
12. For example, medications and nutrients are injected into the amniotic fluid that sur-
rounds the fetus to treat congential hypothyroidism and goiter, and intrauterine malnutrition.
These substances are absorbed by the fetus when it swallows amniotic fluid. Fetal red blood cell
deficiency caused by fetal-maternal RH blood type incompatibility can be treated by transfusing
red blood cells into the fetal peritoneal cavity. See id, supra note 1, at 775-76.
13. Fetoscopy is an example. A fetoscope is an instrument that is inserted through an inci-
sion in the maternal abdominal wall and uterus to allow direct visualization of the fetus. The view
of the fetus at any instant is limited to 2 to 4 cm. of fetal surface. See WILLIAMS OBSTETRICS at
347; the fetoscope also can be used to obtain fetal blood samples and skin biopsies. See Manage-
ment of the Fetus, supra note 1, at 776. For a clinical description of the technique, see I. ROCKER
& K. LAURENCE, FETOSCOPY 51-64 (1981).
14. Ritodrine is a drug that inhibits uterine contractions which typically cause premature
labor when surgical intervention is attempted during pregnancy. See AMA DRUG EVALUATIONS
797-99 (4th ed. 1980). Prostaglandin inhibitors (e.g., Indocin) are also used since prostaglandins
are thought to play a role in stimulating uterine contractions during normal labor. Id. at 798.
15. See, e.g., Harrison, Golbus & Filly, Fetal Surgery for Congential Hydronephrosis, 306
NEw ENG. J. MED. 591-93 (1982) [hereinafter cited as Fetal Surgery]; Clewell, msupra note 9, at
1320-25. Very few fetal abnormalities are presently amenable to in utero surgical treatment. Man-
agement of the Fetus, supra note 1, at 774, 776. Some problems are best handled postnatally or by
manipulating the time of delivery. Id. at 774. The abnormalities that are appropriate candidates
for in utero surgery are those anatomic malformations that interfere with the proper course of
prenatal growth and development. Id. at 776. Harrison has identified three malformations cur-
rently suitable for surgical intervention: bilateral hydronephrosis, obstructive hydrocephalus, and
diaphragmatic hernia. Id. at 775-76.
16. See Clewell, supra note 9. Hydrocephalus is an abnormal accumulation of cerebrospinal
fluid on the brain that results in increased intracranial pressure. This condition, if untreated,
results in gross cranial and facial abnormalities and profound brain damage. This case involved
surgical implantation of a shunting device in the fetal skull to divert excess cerebrospinal fluid.
Id.
17. See Fetal Surgery, supra note 15. Congential hydronephrosis is a condition that results in
atrophy of the kidneys as a result of urinary obstruction. This condition ultimately leads to renal
failure. See DORLAND'S ILLUSTRATED MEDICAL DICTIONARY at 624 (26th ed. 1981); Fetal Sur-
gery, supra note 15, at 592.
18. See Management of the Fetus, supra note 1, at 777.
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birth defects by a less drastic means than abortion. t9 Despite this posi-
tive outlook, the advent of fetal surgery is not without controversy.2 ° In
addition to the auspicious prospect of preventing birth defects, complex
legal, ethical, and moral issues have been raised by the availability of
fetal surgery.2 For example, one moral concern is the impact fetal sur-
gery will have on abortion. Previously, when prenatal diagnosis re-
vealed a congenital or developmental defect the choice was sharply
defined: abort or give birth to an impaired or stillborn child.22 Prenatal
surgery that could cure or minimize crippling defects, however, now
provides a third alternative that makes the choice less clear.23 Al-
though a mother has an absolute constitutional right24 to choose abor-
tion prior to the point of fetal viability,25 the availability of a
therapeutic alternative might make abortion a morally unacceptable
choice.26
In addition to this moral concern, one legal issue created by these
technological advances is whether a mother has the right to refuse rec-
ommended fetal surgery.2 7 At first it would seem that a mother's re-
fusal to consent to recommended fetal surgery could be resolved in the
same manner as a conflict over medical care for a child.28 The distinc-
tion between medical treatment for the child and surgical treatment of
the fetus, however, is based upon the fact that mother and fetus form
an organic whole; treatment of the fetus requires gynecological inter-
vention, treatment of the child does not.2 9 Therefore, since a mother
has a right to refuse medical or surgical treatment for herself, her rights
stand as a potential barrier to mandating fetal therapy against her
19. See Robertson, The Right to Procreate and In Utero Fetal Therapy, 3 J. LEGAL MED. 333,
343 (1982).
20. See Management of the Fetus, supra note I, at 776; Barclay, McCormick, Sidbury,
Michejda & Hodgen, The Ethics of In Utero Surgery, 246 J. AM. MED. A. 1550, 1550-55 (1981);
Fletcher, The Fetus as Patient: Ethical Issues, 246 J. AM. MED. A. 772, 772 (1981). But see Fried-
man, Technology in Search of a Patient (Letters to the Editor), 307 NEw ENG. J. MED. 565, 565
(1982).
21. See id.
22. See Robertson, supra note 19, at 343; Management of the Fetus, supra note I, at 774.
23. Ruddick & Wilcox, supra note 3, at 11; Barclay, McCormick, Sidbury, Michejda & Hod-
gen, The Ethics of In Utero Surgery, 246 J. AM. MED. A. 1550, 1551 (1981).
24. This right was guaranteed by the United States Supreme Court in its landmark abortion
decision. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
25. Id. at 165.
26. See Ruddick & Wilcox, supra note 3, at 11.
27. At the present time fetal surgery is strictly an experimental procedure. See Management
of the Fetus, supra note 1, at 774; Robertson, supra note 19, at 345. This comment will be limited
to a consideration of fetal surgeries that will become accepted medical practice. As Robertson
points out, neither parents nor physicians are obligated to try an experimental alternative to abor-
tion. Id. Since California law prohibits abortion post-viability, except to save the mother's life,
this comment will focus on a conflict over fetal therapy recommended after the point of viability
has been reached. CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE §§25950-25957.
28. See Robertson, supra note 19, at 365-66.
29. See Ruddick & Wilcox, supra note 3, at 12.
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wishes.3°
To determine the appropriate balance between the rights of the
mother and the rights of the fetus, this comment will address the legal
problems surrounding a mother's refusal to consent to recommended
fetal surgery, including both life-enhancing and life-saving fetal treat-
ments. 3' A consideration of the unique circumstances posed by fetal
therapy will demonstrate that in certain situations a mother should be
allowed to refuse. In order to define the circumstances in which a
mother may refuse fetal therapy, it is first necessary to identify the in-
terests involved in the conflict, including (1) the right of the mother to
parental autonomy 32 and bodily integrity,33 (2) the right of the fetus to
independent legal recognition as a patient, 34 and (3) the interest of the
state in protecting the health and welfare of unborn children 35 and in
promoting responsible private medical care decisions. 36
Following an identification of these interests, this comment will as-
sert that a definition of the circumstances in which a mother should be
authorized to refuse fetal surgery must be embodied in a standard for
judicial intervention. Merely determining the circumstances in which a
mother may refuse fetal therapy does not resolve the legal issue posed
by a conflict over a fetal treatment decision. Adequate protection of
the interests of all the parties involved in this conflict requires the adop-
tion of a standard for judicial intervention. The need to provide extra
safeguards for the rights of mother, fetus, and state stems from the per-
vasive uncertainty about the extent of parental authority to make medi-
cal care decisions for a child.3 7 Once fetal surgery becomes accepted
medical practice, the same problem of assessing maternal decisionmak-
ing authority can be anticipated. In part, the uncertainty regarding
parental authority is due to the lack of substantive guidelines in the
statutes that authorize judicial intervention when recommended medi-
cal care for a child is refused.38 Statutes that authorize intervention
seldom provide specific directives to aid judges in determining when
intervention is justified.39 As a result, judicial decisions in these cases
tend to be erratic and inconsistent because they frequently are based
upon a substitution of the value system of the individual judge for that
30. See Robertson, supra note 19, at 353.
31. This comment will emphasize California law.
32. See infra notes 55-63 and accompanying text.
33. See infra notes 64-77 and accompanying text.
34. See infra notes 81-105 and accompanying text.
35. See infra notes 113-119 and accompanying text.
36. See infra notes 106-112 and accompanying text.
37. See Ellis, Letting Defective Babies Die: Who Decides?, 7 AM. J.L. & MED. 393, 401-13
(1982).
38. See infra notes 128-146 and accompanying text.
39. See infra note 121.
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of the parents.40 This lack of substantive guidelines, therefore, tends to
result in decisions that can vary between too little protection for the
interests of the child4 and too great an interference with parental
autonomy.42
Accordingly, this comment will demonstrate that development and
adoption of a standard for judicial intervention in fetal treatment con-
flicts will serve to safeguard the interests of mother, fetus, and state by
clarifying the situations in which a mother has authority to refuse fetal
therapy. Moreover, specific guidelines that clearly define the extent of
maternal authority will help to (1) prevent conflicts from arising, (2) re-
duce the number of inconsistent judicial decisions, (3) define the role of
the physician in a fetal treatment conflict, and (4) help to prevent the
use of malpractice suits as a method for determining the appropriate
standard of care.
Following a discussion of the need for developing a standard for ju-
dicial intervention, this comment will balance the interests of mother,
fetus, and state to delineate the circumstances that will dictate when the
interests of the mother should prevail over those of the fetus. This
comment will suggest that the mother should be allowed to refuse fetal
therapy in two situations. Specifically, a mother should be allowed to
assert her right of parental autonomy to refuse fetal therapy when it is
offered not as a cure, but solely to prolong or salvage the life of a seri-
ously impaired fetus. Similarly, a mother should be allowed to assert
her right of bodily integrity when the efficacy of the recommended
therapy is subject to dispute or the procedure constitutes a significant
risk to her life. Finally, based upon the two situations identified above,
this comment will propose a standard for judicial intervention. Before
addressing the reasons for developing a standard for judicial interven-
tion when a mother refuses recommended fetal therapy, however, it is
first necessary to begin with a description of the interests involved in
this conflict.
INTERESTS INVOLVED IN FETAL SURGERY DECISIONS
A conflict over recommended surgery for the fetus can be analogized
to the conflict encountered when parents refuse recommended medical
care for their child, but not without a recognition of the important dis-
tinctions.43 In the case of medical care for the child the interests impli-
40. See Comment, State Intrusion in Family Affairs: Justfcations and Limitations, 26 STAN.
L. REv. 1383, 1387 (1974).
41. Id.
42. Id.
43. See Robertson, supra note 19, at 365. Mothers have already been forced to undergo
cesarean sections for the benefit of the fetus. See infra notes 208-222 and accompanying text.
1069
Pacdflc Law Journal / Vol 14
cated are those of the parents in controlling the upbringing of their
child, including the right to make medical care decisions for the child;44
the right of the child to be provided with the necessities of life, includ-
ing medical care;45 and the interest of the state in safeguarding the
health, welfare, and safety of the individual child46 and in promoting
responsible private medical care decisions.47 Although there are simi-
larities between the refusal of parents to provide recommended medical
care for their child and the refusal of a mother to allow fetal surgery,
certain significant differences exist.48 Specifically, medical care for the
child involves bodily intrusion on the child only, whereas fetal surgery
requires surgical intervention on the mother as well.49 Moreover, the
legal status of the fetus remains unclear following the refusal of the
United States Supreme Court to recognize the fetus as a person within
the meaning of the United States Constitution. Thus, a fetus may not
possess the same right to medical care that the law affords to a child. A
consideration of these important differences between ordering surgery
for the fetus against the wishes of the mother and ordering medical care
for the child over parental objections will affect the weight given the
interests involved. To assess whether the rights of the mother in a fetal
treatment conflict should be afforded greater weight than the rights of
the fetus, the analysis will begin with a discussion of the nature and
extent of maternal rights.
A. The Mother's Rights"'
Since fetal surgery involves surgery on both fetus and mother, two
constitutionally protected maternal rights are implicated. 2 A mother
44. See Ewald, Medical Decision Makingfor Children: An Analysis ofCompetling Interests, 25
ST. Louis U.L.J. 689, 691 (1982).
45. In California, this right has been codified in Penal Code section 270.
46. See Ewald, supra note 44, at 713.
47. See Carroll v. Skloff, 202 A.2d 9, 11 (Pa. 1964).
48. See Ruddick & Wilcox, supra note 3, at 12.
49. There are examples of forced organ transplants from one sibling for the benefit of an-
other sibling. See, e.g., Strunk v. Strunk, 445 S.W.2d 145 (Ky. Ct. App. 1969); see also Ruddick &
Wilcox, supra note 3, at 12.
50. 410 U.S. at 158.
51. This comment is limited to a discussion of the rights of the mother. The rights of the
father in a fetal treatment conflict are unclear. In the case of Planned Parenthood v. Danforth,
428 U.S. 52 (1976), the Court indicated that, since the mother must bear the child, her decision to
have an abortion must be preferred. Id. at 71. An argument can be made that a mother's decision
to refuse prenatal therapy is analogous and should preclude the father's wishes from overriding
those of the mother.
52. The right of procreative choice guaranteed by Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973), is not
implicated by the conflict that is the focus of this comment. Procreative choice protects a woman's
right to choose abortion up to the point of fetal viability. Id. at 165. Viability is the point at which
the fetus can survive outside the womb. Viability is usually placed at about seven months (28
weeks gestational age) but may occur earlier, even at 24 weeks. Id. at 160. This comment will be
limited to a consideration of conflicts over fetal surgery recommended after the point of viability
has passed. Thus, the right of procreative choice does not directly apply. See Robertson, supra
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possesses the right to parental autonomy in childrearing, including the
right to make medical care decisions for minor children.5 3 Thus, a
mother may be able to assert this right to refuse recommended fetal
surgery that she feels is not justified. Additionally, the mother pos-
sesses a right of bodily integrity that protects against unwarranted bod-
ily intrusion without her consent.5 4 Therefore, a mother also may be
able to assert her right to bodily intergrity by refusing recommended
fetal surgery which requires that she submit to a major surgical proce-
dure. An analysis of the extent of both these rights will help to deter-
mine the extent of a mother's authority to refuse fetal surgery.
L Parental Autonomy
Parental autonomy concerns the right of parents to control the care,
education and custody of their children and prohibits the state from
undue interference with parental decisionmaking, including medical
care decisions." This "natural right" of parents to make decisions on
behalf of their children was first recognized in a line of cases beginning
with Meyer v. Nebraska.56 Ultimately, the United States Supreme
Court decision in Griswold v. Connecticut57 embodied this "natural
right" of parents in a constitutional right of privacy that provides a
shield against state interference into a broad range of family matters.5
Reinforcing the constitutional right of privacy in family matters is our
note 19, at 359. The issue involved is not whether to bear a child, but rather, once the decision has
been made to carry a pregnancy to full term, whether recommended fetal surgery can be refused.
Presumably, a mother has an unqualified right to refuse treatment prior to viability since her right
to choose abortion is still protected by the right of privacy defined in Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. at
152-54. Of course, if it could be established that abortion is an option to which she would never
agree, fetal treatment required before the point of viability could be included in the issue to be
resolved here.
53. See Parham v. J.R., 442 U.S. 584, 602 (1979); Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 213
(1971); Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158 (1943); Goldstein, Medical Carefor the Childat Risk:
On State Supervention of ParentalAutonomy, 86 YALE L.J. 645 (1977).
54. See L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, 890-91 (1978); Regan, Rewriting Roe v.
Wade, 77 MICH. L. REv. 1569 (1979); see supra notes 64-76 and accompanying text.
55. 442 U.S. at 602-603.
56. 262 U.S. 390, 399-400 (1923); Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510, 535 (1925); Wis-
consin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 213 (1972).
57. 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
58. Id. at 482-83, 488. See generally J. NOWAK, R. ROTUNDA & J. YOUNG, HANDBOOK ON
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, at 626 (1978). Certain personal rights embodied within the right of pri-
vacy have been deemed fundamental rights, 381 U.S. at 494-95, and, therefore, legislation affect-
ing these rights is subject to "strict scrutiny" under the due process clause of the fourteenth
amendment. 410 U.S. at 155. Thus, these rights may be interfered with only when necessary to
effectuate a compelling state interest. See NOWAK, supra, at 524. Protection of human life is an
example of a compelling state interest that meets this strict scrutiny test. 410 U.S. at 163. Al-
though the Court has not specifically identified the appropriate standard of review for medical
decisionmaking, it appears to consider this a fundamental right. 406 U.S. at 214, 232 and 410 U.S.
at 211.
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strong societal preference for parental autonomy.5 9 This preference
emanates from a respect for diverse lifestyles and methods of childrear-
ing,60 and a legal recognition of the fact that parents tend to act in the
best interests of their children. 61 Nonetheless, parents do not have an
absolute right to control the lives of their children.62 Thus, when a
parent's refusal to provide recommended medical care for a child
places the child's life or health in jeopardy, the state may intervene on
behalf of the child.63 By analogy, the state should be able to assert this
same right to intervene on behalf of a fetus whose life or health will be
jeopardized by a mother's refusal to consent to fetal surgery. There-
fore, a mother has only a limited right to assert parental autonomy as a
basis for refusing recommended fetal therapy. The right of parental
autonomy, however, is not the only maternal right affected by a conflict
over fetal therapy. Since treatment of the fetus requires at least mini-
mal intervention on the mother, her right to bodily integrity also must
be considered.
2. The Right of Bodily Integrity
In various contexts, the United States Supreme Court has recognized
a qualified right to be free of unwarranted bodily intrusions. 64 This
right guarantees that each individual is entitled to reasonable control
over his or her own body, including the right to refuse judicially or-
dered surgery. In contrast to the right of parental autonomy, which is
protected by the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment,66 the
guarantee of bodily integrity originates in the fourth amendment "right
of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers and effects,
against unreasonable searches and seizures ....
The Constitution does not prohibit all bodily intrusions, however,
59. See In re Phillip B., 92 Cal. App. 3d 796, 801, 156 Cal. Rptr. 48, 51 (1979), cert. denied,
445 U.S. 949 (1980).
60. Id.
61. Parham v. J.R., 442 U.S. 584, 602 (1979).
62. 406 U.S. at 230; 442 U.S. at 603; 321 U.S. at 166.
63. 92 Cal. App. 3d at 801, 156 Cal. Rptr. at 51.
64. "mhe right of every individual to the possession and control of his own person, free from
all restraint or interference of others, unless by clear and unquestionable authority of law." See
Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 9 (1968) (quoting Union Pac. Ry. v. Botsford, 141 U.S. 250, 251 (1891)).
65. See Bowden v. State, 510 S.W.2d 879, 881 (Ark. 1974); People v. Smith, 362 N.Y.S.2d
909, 914 (Sup. Ct. Queens County 1974); Comment, In Search of Evidence Against a Criminal
Defendant: The Conslitutionality ofJudicially Ordered Surgery, 22 CATH. LAWYER 315, 327 (1976).
66. See supra note 58 and accompanying text.
67. U.S. CONST. amend. IV; see Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757, 767 (1966). In
Schmerber the Court developed a three part test to be applied in determining the reasonableness
of the proposed bodily intrusion: (1) there must be a clear indication that evidence will be found;(2) the test itself must be reasonable; and (3) the test must be performed in a reasonable manner.
Id. at 766-72.
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only those that are unreasonable.68 For example, compulsory vaccina-
tions have been upheld for the protection of public health.69 Addition-
ally, courts have permitted bodily intrusions to gain evidence for use
against criminal defendants, including forced blood samples7" and
body cavity searches.7 The few cases that have mandated surgery to
obtain evidence, however, have made a distinction between minor and
major surgical procedures.72 Major surgery requiring more than local
anesthesia has been prohibited.7 3 Consequently, surgical removal of
evidence will be allowed only when the risks of surgery are minimal
and only when the need for evidence is important enough to justify the
intrusion."
Based upon these precedents from the area of criminal law, it would
appear that a mother could assert her right to bodily integrity to refuse
a major surgical procedure required to perform surgery on the fetus.
Her right to refuse fetal treatment requiring only minor surgery, how-
ever, would seem to be restricted to "unreasonable" procedures. Nev-
ertheless, any forced surgical treatment on the body of one person for
the benefit of another is held in disregard in our society.7 5 A high value
has been placed on individual freedom. Courts, therefore, are reluctant
to allow violations of this liberty.7 6 Despite this high regard for per-
sonal liberty, however, courts have continued to order life-saving blood
transfusions for Jehovah's Witnesses when the welfare of their minor
children was dependent upon the parents' continued survival.77 Thus,
the cases dealing with bodily intrusions stand for the proposition that a
mother only has a qualified right to refuse recommended fetal surgery.
68. See, e.g., Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132, 147 (1925); Ker v. California, 374 U.S.
23, 33 (1963).
69. See Jacobson v. Massachusetts, 197 U.S. 11, 31 (1905).
70. 384 U.S. at 768-72; Breithaupt v. Abram, 352 U.S. 432, 433 (1957).
71. See, e.g., Rivas v. United States, 368 F.2d 703, 712 (9th Cir. 1966), cert. denied, 386 U.S.
945 (1967).
72. Compare United States v. Crowder, 543 F.2d 312, 315-16 (D.C. Cir. 1976) with 510
S.W.2d at 881 and 362 N.Y.S.2d at 911.
73. 510 S.W.2d at 881; 362 N.Y.S.2d at 911.
74. Id.
75. See Regan, Rewriting Roe v. Wade, 77 MICH. L. REV. 1569, 1583-89 (1979).
76. 384 U.S. at 772. In fact, this high esteem for personal liberty has resulted in a "right to
die" movement, created in the wake of the Karen Quinlan case. See In re Quinlan, 355 A.2d 647
(N.J. 1976). California provides this right by statute. CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE §7186.
77. See Application of the President of Georgetown College, 331 F.2d 1000 (D.C. Cir.), cert.
denied, 377 U.S. 978 (1964) (Court prohibited Jehovah's Witness from refusing life-saving treat-
ment for herself because she was the mother of a seven month old child). These cases have in-
volved a relatively minor bodily intrusion, such as a blood transfusion. More major intrusions,
including organ donations from a parent to save a child's life, have not been ordered and appear
less likely. Ruddick & Wilcox, supra note 3, at 12. Moreover, it has been argued that until organ
donations become mandatory, forcing a mother to submit to surgery for the benefit of the fetus is
prejudicial to women since fathers are not bound by the same requirement. Id. Nevertheless,
forced surgery on the mother to save the life of of the fetus has already been ordered. See infra
notes 208-22 and accompanying text.
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Accordingly, the right of a mother to refuse fetal surgery will depend
upon balancing the degree of maternal risk against the fetal need for
the recommended procedure.
To balance maternal risk against fetal need, however, it is first neces-
sary to determine whether a fetal right to medical care exists. If the
fetus has no independent right to medical care, the right of a mother to
refuse fetal surgery might be absolute. On the other hand, if the Cali-
fornia statutes and case law establish the fetus as an independent pa-
tient, the right of a mother to refuse fetal therapy may be foreclosed.
The question of whether the fetus has legal rights as a patient has not
been resolved;78 in fact, the controversy over what rights the fetus
should possess has not abated since the United States Supreme Court
declared a decade ago that the fetus is not a "person" within the mean-
ing of the United States Constitution. 9 Despite this refusal to consider
the fetus a person, technology has transformed the fetus into a pa-
tient.8" Therefore, a determination of the legal rights of the fetal pa-
tient is now required. An analysis of the California case law and
statutes will follow to determine whether an independent fetal right to
medical treatment exists.
B. The Fetal Patient-A New Fetal Right
Prior to the last century, the fetus was accorded few rights. At com-
mon law, a child en ventra sa mereII was viewed as simply a part of its
mother with no separate existence of its own.8 2 The fetal rights that
were given legal recognition were for the purposes of inheritance and
property law and became effective only in the event of the fetus' subse-
quent birth.83
Modernly, however, fetal rights have been expanded well beyond the
few rights that existed at common law.84 For example, California stat-
utes and case law provide the fetus a cause of action for prenatal inju-
ries, 5 a right to support from its parents, 86 and a limited right to
78. For an overview of fetal rights, see generally Doudera, Fetal Rights? It depends, 18
TRIAL April 1982, at 18; Shaw & Damme,LegalStatus of the Fetus, in GENETICS AND THE LAW 3
(A. Milunsky & G. Annas, eds. 1976).
79. 410 U.S. at 158.
80. See Ruddick & Wilcox, supra note 3, at 11.
81. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY (5th ed. 1979) (a French phrase meaning "in its mother's
womb").
82. See Comment, Recoveryfor Prenatallnjuries: The Right of a Child.Against its Mother, X
SUFFOLK U.L. REv. 582, 584-85 (1976).
83. See W. BLACKSTONE COMMENTARIES *130 (1762); Scott v. McPheeters, 33 Cal. App. 2d
629, 92 P.2d 678, hearing denied, 93 P.2d 562, 33 Cal. App. 2d 629 (1939).
84. See supra note 78.
85. CAL. CIV. CODE §29.
86. CAL. PENAL CODE §270; CAL. CIV. CODE §186.
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recover for its wrongful birth.8 7 Notwithstanding this expansion, the
legal and moral status of the fetus remains unclear.8 8 Although the fe-
tus has not gained constitutional recognition as a person,89 medical
technology has allowed the fetus to become an independent patient. 0
Therefore, the law also must respond to the pressure of technological
change by affording legal recognition of the fetal patient. In fact, an
analysis of existing California statutes, particularly Civil Code section
2991 and Penal Code section 270,92 reveals an argument that may be
offered as support for the proposition that the fetus already possesses
legal rights as a patient. Specifically, Civil Code section 29 provides
that "a child conceived, but not yet born, is to be deemed an existing
person, so far as may be necessary for its interests in the event of its
subsequent birth."93 Section 29 is a statutory change from the com-
mon-law view that rejected a fetal cause of action for prenatal inju-
ries.94 The common-law rationale for rejecting a fetal right to recover
for prenatal injuries included a lack of precedent,95 absence of a duty to
the fetus since it had no separate existence from its mother,96 a fear of
fraudulent claims, 97 and fear of encouraging suits against the mother
for her conduct during pregnancy. 98 Increasing dissatisfaction with the
common-law view ultimately lead to a rejection of this position in the
case of Bonbrest v. Katz.9 9 The Bonbrest decision, which established a
fetal right to recover for injuries suffered prior to birth, was eventually
codified in Civil Code section 29.1° Section 29 places a duty on
tortfeasors to act reasonably in order to avoid injuring the fetus.' °1
Moreover, since the statute recognizes the fetus as a life in being from
the time of conception, it acknowledges the independent legal existence
of the fetus. 102
87. See Turpin v. Sortini, 31 Cal. 3d 220, 239, 643 P.2d 954, 966, 182 Cal. Rptr. 337, 349
(1982).
88. See Robertson, supra note 19, at 360.
89. 410 U.S. at 158.
90. See Robertson, supra note 19, at 360. The argument is made that once the fetus has
passed the point of viability, the mother has abrogated her right not to procreate by foregoing
abortion. Hence, the moral worth of the fetus is stronger and less controversial than pre-viability.
Id.
91. CAL. CIv. CODE §29.
92. CAL. PENAL CODE §270.
93. CAL. CIV. CODE §29.
94. Id. §29. Norman v. Murphy, 124 Cal. App. 2d 95, 98, 268 P.2d 178, 180 (1954); Kyne v.
Kyne, 38 Cal. App. 2d 122, 127, 100 P.2d 806, 809 (1940); 33 Cal. App. 2d 632-33, 92 P.2d 680-81..
95. See, e.g., Allaire v. St. Luke's Hosp., 56 N.E. 638, 640 (InI. 1900).
96. 33 Cal. App. 2d at 632, 92 P.2d at 680.
97. See, e.g., Stanford v. St. Louis-San Francisco Ry., 108 So. 566, 566 (Ala. Sup. Ct. 1926).
98. 56 N.E. at 640.
99. 65 F. Supp. 138 (1946).
100. See CAL. CIV. CODE §29.
101. See supra note 94.
102. 4 B. WrTKIN, SUMMARY OF CALIFORNIA LAW Torts §379 (8th ed. 1973). Thus, California
has avoided the problem of determining whether the fetus is a person as a prerequisite to recovery.
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Despite the broad scope of section 29, it does not specifically guaran-
tee a fetal right to necessary medical care."°3 Penal Code section 270,
however, holds a parent criminally liable for failing to provide the ne-
cessities of life, including medical care, to his or her unborn child." 4
Although Penal Code section 270 grants a fetal right to necessary medi-
cal care, it does not grant a cause of action in the fetus to enforce that
right. Accordingly, in order to establish a fetal right to recognition as a
patient independent of its mother, Civil Code section 29 must be read
in conjunction with Penal Code section 270. Penal Code section 270
supplies the specific fetal right to medical care, and Civil Code section
29 provides the civil action by which the fetus can enforce that right.
Therefore, since Penal Code section 270 places a duty upon parents to
provide their unborn child with the necessities of life including medical
care, and Civil Code section 29 provides a cause of action to the fetus
for anything beneficial to its interests, statutory authority already exists
to afford legal recognition of the fetal patient. 10 5
A statutory authorization of a fetal right to patient status is not suffi-
cient to ensure the protection of this right. Since the fetus is unable to
assert its own interests, the state may be required to intervene to protect
The only requirement is that the fetus be born alive and not be claiming recovery under a purely
statutory right. See, e.g., CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE §377 (wrongful death statute). Bayer v. Suttle, 23
Cal. App. 3d 361, 364-65, 100 Cal. Rptr. 212, 214-15 (1972) (the court denied recovery for the
wrongful death of the fetus). This appears to be a minority position. 23 Cal. App. 3d at 363, 100
Cal. Rptr. at 213.
103. This section has been construed to guarantee protection of whatever is "profitable or
beneficial" to the unborn child in the event of its subsequent birth. 38 Cal. App. 2d at 127, 100
P.2d at 809; 33 Cal. App. 2d at 631, 92 P.2d at 680. Although the scope of the statute is potentially
limitless, courts have refused to extend the protection of section 29 to criminal statutes that fail to
include the fetus specifically. In the case of Keeler v. Superior Court, 2 Cal. 3d 619, 470 P.2d 617,
87 Cal. Rptr. 481 (1970), the California Supreme Court refused to find the fetus to be a person
within the meaning of the homicide statute. The legislature responded to this decision by amend-
ing the statute to include the fetus. See CAL. PENAL CODE §187. In Reyes v. the Superior Court,
Etc., 75 Cal. App. 3d 214, 141 Cal. Rptr. 912 (1977), the court refused to apply the felony child
endangering statute to a heroin addict for using heroin during her pregnancy and for failing to
obtain prenatal care. Id. at 219, 141 Cal. Rptr. at 914. The mother subsequently gave birth to
twins who were addicted to heroin and suffered withdrawal. Id. at 217, 141 Cal. Rptr. at 913. The
court held that the legislature intended to exclude unborn children from the statutory designation
"child." The reluctance of courts to extend section 29 to the criminal law is based upon a policy of
narrowly construing criminal liability, rather than a reluctance to expand fetal rights. 75 Cal.
App. 3d at 914, 141 Cal. Rptr. at 219.
104. CAL. PENAL CODE §270, provides in pertinent part:
If a parent of a minor child wilfully omits, without lawful excuse, to furnish necessary
clothing, food, shelter or medical attendance, or other remedial care for his or her child,
he or she is guilty of a misdemeanor .... A child conceived but not yet born is to be
deemed an existing person insofar as this section is concerned.
Since section 270 specifically includes the fetus, the policy argument for narrowly construing crim-
inal statutes is inapplicable. It could be argued, however, that reliance on section 270 as authority
for legal recognition of the fetal patient does expand parental criminal liability. The rights of the
fetus as a patient could be interpreted to include a maternal duty not only to employ all appropri-
ate fetal therapy but also to discover whether treatment might be needed. See infra notes 187-198
and accompanying text. See also Robertson, supra note 19, at 352.
105. See supra notes 91-104.
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fetal patient rights if the mother fails to do so. Thus, the rights and
responsibilities of the state in a fetal treatment conflict also must be
explored.
C. The Duties and Interests of the State
The state has an interest in the health and welfare of its citizens both
collectively and as individuals. 0 6 Thus, the state has a duty to protect
the interests of society when parental conduct poses a threat to the
political, social, economic or moral concerns of the general public. 10 7
The power of the state to regulate parental conduct for public health
and welfare reasons derives from its sovereign police power, 0 8 and in-
cludes the right to protect society from a collective financial burden by
promoting responsible medical care decisions. 109 Based upon this right
to protect the public fisc, the state has an interest in preventing a
mother from refusing fetal surgery that would cure a serious fetal de-
fect. Since fetal surgery would not be attempted if the procedure could
be postponed until after birth, a mother's refusal to allow the only pos-
sible "cure" would be characterized as an irresponsible decision." 0
Thus, allowing a mother to refuse fetal surgery that could cure or pre-
vent a birth defect may result in a significant economic burden on soci-
ety."' Since children born with serious birth defects often require
lifetime institutional care, the need for state financial support of these
children is an accepted reality. 12
The state also has an interest in the welfare of the individual child." 3
If a child is deemed neglected or abused, the state is justified to inter-
vene on its behalf."4 When the state does intervene to protect the inter-
ests of a child, the power to do so is based upon the doctrine ofparens
patriae.1"1 This doctrine authorizes the state to intervene in family af-
106. See Kleinfeld, The Balance of Power.4mong Infants, Their Parents and the State, 4 FAM.
L.Q. 410, 415 (1970).
107. See Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. at 165 (1943); Comment, State Intrusion into Famiy
Affairs: Justifications and Limitations, 26 STAN. L. REv. 1383, 1387 (1974). An example of state
intervention into family matters on behalf of society is the requirement that all children be vacci-
nated before entering school. See Jacobson v. Massachusetts, 197 U.S. 11, 31 (1905).
108. 197 U.S. at 25.
109. See Comment, Parental Liabilityfor Prenatal Injury, 14 COLUM. J.L. & Soc. PROBs. 47,
82 (1978).
110. See Comment, supra note 107, at 1390.
111. See Friedman, supra note 3, at 111 n.123.
112. See Comment, supra note 107, at 1390.
113. See Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 395 (1922). In California, this power has been
codified in Welfare & Institutions Code sections 300 and 727.
114. 92 Cal. App. 3d at 51, 156 Cal. Rptr. at 801.
115. Citing origins in the English common law, J. Cardozo describedparenspatriae:
The chancellor ... acts as parens patriae to do what is best for the interest of the child.
He is to put himself in the position of a "wise, affectionate, and careful parent" and make
provision for the child accordingly. He "interferes for the protection of infants, qua
infants, by virtue of the perogative which belongs to the Crown as parens patriae."
1077
Pacific Law Journal / VoL 14
fairs to protect the health, safety, and welfare of children. " 6 Similarly,
it is appropriate for the state to invoke the doctrine ofparenspatriae in
the context of a conflict over recommended fetal surgery. When a
mother's refusal to consent to fetal surgery constitutes an unjustifiable
threat to the health or safety of an individual fetus, the state should
have the power to intervene.'1 7 Nonetheless, the state must show
strong justification for intervening against the wishes of the parents on
behalf of the individual child." 8 This justification is required not only
because of our societal preference for parental autonomy, but also be-
cause the appropriateness of any medical care recommended for the
child may be the subject of legitimate disagreement." 9 Accordingly,
the situations in which the state is authorized to intervene on behalf of
the individual fetus should be clearly defined.
As demonstrated, an analysis of the interests of mother, fetus and
state discloses that each has significant interests at stake when a mother
refuses recommended fetal therapy. The mother has constitutionally
protected rights to parental autonomy and bodily integrity. Neither
right, however, provides the mother absolute control over fetal treat-
ment decisions. Likewise, an examination of California case law and
statutes identifies existing legal rights for the fetus as a patient. The
extent of these rights, however, is uncharted and may be dependent
upon the nature of the rights of the mother. Finally, the state has an
interest in protecting the health of unborn children and an interest in
promoting responsible private medical care decisions affecting the
fetus.
To ensure that the rights of the mother, fetus and state will be safe-
guarded, however, when a mother does refuse fetal surgery, it is neces-
sary to develop a standard for judicial intervention. The adoption of a
standard will accomplish several important objectives. Initially, a stan-
dard will provide substantive guidelines to resolve a conflict that arises
when fetal therapy is refused by clarifying what decisions a mother is
authorized to make. A clear understanding of the mother's decision-
making authority will help to prevent conflicts from developing and
also will help to reduce the number of inconsistent judicial decisions.
In addition, substantive guidelines for judicial intervention will fore-
stall the use of medical malpractice suits as a vehicle for determining
Finlay v. Finlay, 148 N.E. 624, 626 (N.Y. App. 1925) (citations omitted).
116. See Ewald, supra note 44, at 713-14.
117. Although the fetus is not specifically identified in California Welfare and Institutions
Code sections 300 and 727, the fetal right to patient status authorized by California statutes would
enable the state to intervene on behalf of the fetus. See supra notes 91-104 and accompanying
text.
118. See In re Phillip B., 92 Cal. App. 3d at 801, 156 Cal. Rptr. at 51.
119. See Comment, supra note 107, at 1386.
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the appropriate standard of care, and will help to clarify the role of the
physician when a conflict does arise.
JUDICIAL INTERVENTION ON BEHALF OF THE FETUS-A RATIONALE
FOR DEVELOPING A STANDARD
The desirability of developing a standard for judicial intervention in
conflicts over medical care for the fetus would appear to be obvious: it
would provide a consistent method for resolving conflicts and would
also aid in preventing some conflicts by delineating the relative rights
and responsibilities of the parties involved. 2 ° Despite the advantages
of developing firm guidelines, statutes authorizing state intervention on
behalf of abused or neglected children seldom provide substantive gui-
dance.' 21 One possible reason for this omission is that developing a
standard for resolving medical care conflicts often requires confronta-
tion with difficult moral and ethical issues that many individuals are
reluctant to face.' 22
Another reason for a lack of firm guidelines is that technology fre-
quently creates a novel situation that gives rise to an unanticipated con-
flict.' 23 Indeed, the issue presented by fetal surgery, whether the state
can require bodily intrusion on the mother to assist the child, has not
previously arisen.' 24 Resolution of this question, however, will benefit
from substantive guidelines for state intervention. Therefore, an analy-
sis of the need for a decisionmaking framework will follow.
Two potential problems are generated by a failure to develop an ap-
propriate framework to deal with a conflict over fetal therapy. First,
parents and physicians are often unsure what decisions they are author-
120. See infra notes 168-236 and accompanying text.
121. See, e.g., NEV. REV. STAT. §201.090 (1981) (a neglected child is any person less than 18
years of age who is not provided with the necessities of life by his parents); N.Y. SoC. SERV. LAW
§§371, 383b (Commissioner of Social Services may give consent for medical and hospital services
for any child found to be neglected. A neglected child is one whose parents have failed to supply
adequate medical or surgical care). The number of standards proposed for state intervention in
medical decisionmaking for children underscores this lack. See, e.g., J. GOLDSTEIN, A. FREUD &
A. SOLNIT, BEFORE THE BEST INTERESTS OF THE CHILD (1979); Goldstein, Medical Care for the
Child at Risk- On State Supervention of Parental Autonomy, 86 YALE L.J. 645 (1977); Sokolosky,
The Sick Child and the Reluctant Parent-A Framework for Judicial Intervention, 20 J. FAM. L. 69
(1981-82); Comment, Court Ordered Non-Emergency Medical Carefor Infants, 18 CLEV.-MAR. L.
REV. 296 (1969); Comment, State Intrusion into Family Affairs: Justfcations and Limitations, 26
STAN. L. REV. 1383 (1974).
122. See Duff& Campbell, Moral and Ethical Dilemmas in the Special-Care Nursery, 289 NEW
ENG. J. MED., October 25, 1973, at 890, 893. Ellis, Letting Defective Babies Die: Who decides?, 7
AM. J.L. & MED. 393, 413 (1982). Other than for religious objections, parents rarely refuse to
provide their child medical care that is clearly warranted. The difficulty arises in cases where the
benefits or results of treatment are ambiguous or where "quality of life" considerations are impli-
cated by the treatment proposed.
123. See Robertson, supra note 19, at 353.
124. Id.
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ized to make without incurring civil or criminal liability.' 25 As a result,
liability for use or omission of a new therapeutic technique is resolved
by two equally unsatisfactory methods: routine judicial intervention
prior to treatment 26 or resolution of liability in court "after the
fact."' 27 Second, a lack of firm guidelines results in erratic and incon-
sistent judicial decisions that are often the result of substituting the val-
ues of the individual judge for those of the parents.' 28 Each of these
problems will be explored in demonstrating the need for a standard.
A. Inconsistent Judicial Decisions
Faced with a vague statutory grant of authority to intervene on be-
half of children deemed abused or neglected, judges are often left on
their own to define an appropriate social policy as a basis for resolving
medical care conflicts. 29 For example, California Welfare and Institu-
tions Code section 300(b) provides that a child may be adjudged a de-
pendent of the court if the child is not provided with "the necessities of
life." ' 30 The following cases will illustrate the varying interpretations
that can apply to the phrase "necessities of life" or the equivalent
phrases used in other jurisdictions.
In the case of In re Philljp B.,131 the court did not consider life-pro-
longing surgery to be within the ambit of "necessities of life."' 3 2 In-
stead, the court upheld the right of the parents to refuse cardiac surgery
for their 12 year old son who was a victim of Down's Syndrome.133
Although medical opinion indicated that Phillip's life would be se-
verely shortened without the surgery, the court concluded that there
was no clear and convincing evidence that Phillip was not provided
with the "necessities of life."'134 In reaching this decision, the court
stressed that the state has a "serious burden of justification before
abridging parental autonomy by substituting its judgment for that of
125. See Ellis, upra note 122, at 401-13; Duff & Campbell, supra note 122, at 894.
126. See Bowes & Selgestad, Fetal Versus Maternal Rights: Medical and Legal Perspectives,
OBSTETRICS & GYNECOLOGY, August 1981, at 209, 214. Practical reasons also exist to avoid the
need for judicial intervention as a routine solution for fetal treatment conflicts. Time is often the
enemy of judicial intervention during pregnancy. Especially during labor, the onset of problems
can be so sudden and fetal deterioration so rapid that a judicial hearing is impossible. Shriner,
Maternal Versus Fetal Rights: A Clinical Dilemma, OBSTETRICS AND GYNECOLOGY, April 1979, at
518, 519.
127. See Friedman, supra note 3, at 116.
128. See S. KArZ, WHEN PARENTS FAIL 70-79 (1971); Comment, supra note 107, at 1392;
Sokolosky, supra note 121, at 70.
129. See KATz, supra note 128, at 59.
130. CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE §300(b).
131. 92 Cal. App. 3d 796, 156 Cal. Rptr. 48 (1979), cert. denied, 445 U.S. 949 (1980).
132. 92 Cal. App. 3d at 803, 156 Cal. Rptr. at 52.
133. Id. at 800, 156 Cal. Rptr. at 50.
134. Id. at 802-03, 156 Cal. Rptr. at 51, 52.
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the parents."'135
By contrast, in the case of In Re Karwath,36 the Iowa court ordered
tonsillectomies on three children over the religious objections of their
father.137 The court based its right to intervene on an interpretation of
the statutory duty of parents to provide "necessary medical care" to
mean a duty to provide "ordinary" medical care even in the absence of
immediate risk to life. 138 The Pennsylvania court in the case of Re
Green,'139 however, refused to uphold a court ordered spinal fusion to
ameliorate a polio-induced spinal curvature over the mother's religious
objections absent a finding that the life of the child was endangered."4
The court's sole statutory guideline for determining a need to intervene
was an assessment of whether Ricky Green was a "neglected child."'I
In addition, the medical literature includes case reports of treatment
conflicts involving defective newborns that present even more compel-
ling evidence of the inconsistent results that a lack of substantive guide-
lines engenders.142 A court in Maryland refused to order surgery for a
child afflicted with Down's Syndrome who was also born with duode-
nal atresia and intestinal obstruction, a condition that would require
surgery to allow the child's digestive system to function. The court de-
clared that it "would not force the parents or society to bear the burden
of such a child."'14 3 A court in Maine, however, ordered surgery on a
newborn with no left eye, no right ear canal, several unfused vertebrae,
and various digestive abnormalities that prevented normal feeding by
mouth.'" The total effect of these birth defects meant that the child
would be paralyzed, blind, deaf, unable to communicate, and perhaps
unable to stand. 141 Nevertheless, the court declared that parents have
no right to withhold treatment and that the basic right enjoyed by every
human being is the right to life itself.146
As these examples illustrate, vaguely worded statutes leave room for
widely differing interpretations. Courts almost invariably consider life-
saving medical treatment to be inherent in the meaning of "necessary
medical care," but are divided on whether "necessary medical care"
mandates state intervention for anything less than lifesaving medical
135. Id. at 801, 802, 156 Cal. Rptr. at 51.
136. 199 N.W.2d 147 (Iowa 1972).
137. Id. at 150.
138. Id.
139. 292 A.2d 387 (Pa. 1972).
140. Id. at 392.
141. Id. at 387.
142. See Gimbel, Infanticide: Who Makes the Decision?, 73 WIs. MED. J., May 1974, at 10.
143. Id.
144. Id.
145. Id. at 11.
146. Id.
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treatment.147 In the absence of a clearly defined public policy specify-
ing the extent of parental authority to make medical care decisions on
behalf of children, judicial decisions may often be only a reflection of
the value systems of the individual judge. 48 In cases of child abuse or
failure to provide lifesaving medical care for an otherwise healthy
child, there is general agreement that state intervention is appropri-
ate." 19 In cases where the recommended treatment would prolong or
salvage a life of low quality, however, societal consensus disappears. 50
A quality of life dilemma often will be presented by a conflict over fetal
surgery since the fetus requiring surgery will always have some pre-
existing genetic or developmental defect.' 5' Thus, the appropriateness
of lifesaving medical treatments for seriously impaired fetuses will al-
most always require a quality of life value judgment. 152 Rather than
leave this kind of quality of life decision to the discretion of the partic-
ular judge, it should be left to the person most affected by the deci-
sion-the mother.1
53
Accordingly, a standard that assigns responsibility for quality of life
decisions to the mother will significantly reduce the inconsistent judi-
cial decisions that result when a court interposes its own value judg-
ments, because the need for judicial intervention will be greatly
reduced. Furthermore, since maternal decisionmaking authority will
be more clearly defined, and judicial decisionmaking authority will be
limited, adoption of a standard will help to ensure that those decisions
requiring judicial intervention will be more consistent. Adoption of
this standard will not mean that fetal treatment decisions involving
quality of life questions will invariably be handled in the same manner.
Instead, it assures that whatever the ultimate decision is, it will be made
by those who will bear the day-to-day burden of the social, psychologi-
cal, and economic costs.
In addition to the problem of inconsistent judicial decisions, failure
to define parental decisionmaking authority has an impact on another
party involved in medical care conflicts-namely, the physician.'
5 4
Uncertainty about parental authority tends to confuse the appropriate
role physicians should play in medical care conflicts.' 5 5 In addition,
new technology, such as fetal surgery, tends to raise standards of care
147. See supra notes 131-42 and accompanying text.
148. See KATz, supra note 128, at 59.
149. Id. at 11, 23.
150. Id. at 11. Goldstein, supra note 121, at 54.
151. See Management of the Fetus, supra note 1, at 775-76.
152. See Gimbel, supra note 142, at 11.
153. Id.
154. See Ellis, supra note 122, at 415.
155. Id.
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more quickly than the law can respond.1 56
B. The Role of the Physician
Whenever technology outpaces the ability of society to respond in
assigning legal responsibility for employing or failing to employ new
therapeutic techniques, two possible approaches to malpractice liability
result: (1) criminal and civil liability is determined in the courts "after
the fact,"' 57 or (2) routine judicial intervention is sought. 158 Neither
approach is satisfactory for a number of reasons and can be avoided by
establishing substantive guidelines for intervention.
In particular, determining liability in court long after the event is
especially burdensome on physicians. Although there is no profes-
sional liability for failing to recommend experimental procedures, 159
the line that divides an experimental procedure from an established
one is never clear. 60 Thus, a standard that clarifies the rights and re-
sponsibilities of parents and physicians in fetal treatment conflicts can
help to smooth the transition.
In addition, the physician16" ' providing health care to a pregnant wo-
man has two patients simultaneously, the mother and the fetus. When
the interests of these two patients conflict, the question arises as to
whose interest should prevail. The physician who chooses one is left
open to a charge of abandonment of the other.' 62 This professional
dilemma was illustrated in a report of a mother who refused a cesarean
section recommended for severe fetal distress during labor. 163 The phy-
sicians and the hospital were concerned that a failure to act on behalf
of the fetus would result in charges of professional or institutional neg-
ligence."6 On the other hand, the possibility of criminal assault
charges existed if surgery were performed against the mother's will. 65
The solution to this dilemma was to request the intervention of the
156. See Professional Liability Newsletter XIV, no. 1, at 2 (Dec. 1982) (copy on file at the
Pacfc Law Journal).
157. See Bowes & Selgestad, Fetal Versus Maternal Rights: Medical and Legal Persfpectives,
OBSTETRICS & GYNECOLOGY, August 1981, at 209, 214.
158. See Ellis, supra note 122, at 401-13; Duff& Campbell, Moral and Ethical Dilemmas in the
Special-Care Nursery, 289 NEw ENG. J. MED. 890, 894, October 25, 1973.
159. See Robertson, supra note 19, at 346.
160. Id. at 351 n.85.
161. Because fetal treatments ordinarily require surgical interventions, it is assumed that the
health care provider involved in a conflict over the use of any treatment will be a licensed
physician.
162. See Ruddick & Wilcox, supra note 3, at 12; see also Colautti v. Franklin, 439 U.S. 379,
400 (1979). The Court, in declaring §5a of the Pennsylvania Abortion Control Act void for vague-
ness, recognized the serious ethical and constitutional difficulties inherent in the question of
whether the physician's paramount duty is to mother or fetus. Id
163. Bowles & Selgestad, supra note 157, at 209.
164. Id. at 211.
165. Id.
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juvenile court to avoid possible professional liability.'66 In a case like
this, a standard for state intervention that clearly indicates the mother's
decisionmaking authority frequently would eliminate the need to resort
to judicial intervention to prevent potential malpractice liability. In-
stead, the role of the physician could be limited to providing informa-
tion on all possible treatment options, including the option of no
treatment at all. Then the final decision could be left to the mother in
all cases in which she had specific authority to decide.' 67
Thus, a standard for judicial intervention would accomplish several
important objectives by providing specific clarification of maternal
decisionmaking authority in fetal therapy conflicts. First, the interests
of the mother, the fetus and the state would be safeguarded from incon-
sistent judicial decisions based upon vague statutory authority for state
intervention. Furthermore, substantive guidelines for intervention will
prevent too great an interference with maternal rights and too little
protection of fetal rights. Second, the adoption of a standard will help
to confine the physician's role to one of counselling and advising the
mother of the available fetal treatment options. Finally, a standard
will help to prevent unfair liability for physicians as fetal surgery be-
gins to cross the line from an experimental procedure to a procedure
clearly within the standard of care.
As demonstrated, compelling reasons exist for adopting a standard
for judicial intervention in fetal treatment conflicts. Formulating a
standard, however, requires making a policy decision to allow the in-
terests of one party in the conflict to prevail over those of the other
parties. Thus, in order to determine which interests should prevail in a
fetal treatment conflict, the interests of the mother, fetus and state must
be weighed and balanced.
BALANCING THE INTERESTS
In balancing the interests of the mother, the fetus, and the state when
recommended fetal surgery is refused, an analysis of whose interest
should prevail can begin from one of three points of view. 68 These
views are as follows:
(1) Thefetal view, which would require that all fetal treatment deci-
sions be made in favor of the fetus, except when the mother's life is
166. Id. at 212.
167. See infra pp. 67-68 (A Standard for Judicial Intervention in Fetal Treatment Decisions).
168. See Ruddick & Wilcox, supra note 3, at 12-13. The authors suggest three "therapeutic
contracts" that might serve as a basis for an understanding between a mother and her physician
regarding the physician's duty in treating the fetus.
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threatened by the procedure. 169
(2) The maternal view, which would allow the mother sole authority
for all fetal treatment decisions with no state intervention permitted. 7 °
(3) The qual4ed maternal view, which would permit the mother to
make most fetal treatment decisions, but would authorize the state to
intervene on behalf of the fetus in certain situations.171 Each of these
views will be explored in order to demonstrate that the third option is
the only choice that adequately protects the interests of fetus, mother,
and state.
A. The Fetal View
The fetal view would require that the mother submit to all recom-
mended fetal surgery unless the procedure threatened her own life.
This view is unacceptable for a number of reasons. Primarily, the fetal
view presents an unnecessary interference with the mother's rights of
parental autonomy and bodily integrity.' 72 Since most mothers are
committed to doing whatever is necessary to assure the best possible
outcome for their child, the number of treatment refusals is likely to be
very small.' 73 In fact, an examination of the actual procedures used in
fetal surgery reveals two situations in which a mother is most likely to
refuse a proposed treatment.174
The first situation would be when the recommended treatment re-
quired a major surgical procedure, such as a cesarean section, on the
mother. 75 The reasons for refusal in this situation might include reli-
gious beliefs or fear of surgery. 176 The other situation in which a rejec-




172. See supra notes 55-77.
173. See Robertson, supra note 19, at 351 n.86.
174. For example, the procedure to repair bilateral congenital hydronephrosis required a
cesarean section on the mother in order to remove the fetus so that the fetal surgery could be
performed. The fetus was removed without interrupting fetomaternal circulation. Once the repair
was completed, the fetus was returned to the uterus to await cesarean delivery three months later.
See Fetal Surgery, supra note 15, at 591. By contrast, the implantation of the shunting device to
correct hydrocephalus required only a small incision in the mother's abdomen. This was followed
by insertion of a thirteen-gauge needle through the incision into the fetal skull. The needle then
served as a conduit for the introduction of the shunt. See Clewell, supra note 15, at 1321. In a
case like this one, the level of intervention on the mother is roughly equivalent to that required for
amniocentesis. Consequently, refusals are less likely to occur when this type of treatment is rec-
ommended since the mother often would have already agreed to an equally intrusive diagnostic
test to discover the fetal problem sought to be alleviated. See Management of the Fetus, supra note
I, at 777. An exception would be a refusal based upon the fear of salvaging a damaged fetus that
might not otherwise have survived.
175. See Robertson, supra note 19, at 351, n.86, 361.
176. See Leiberman, Mazor, Chaim & Cohen, The Fetal Right to Live, OBSTETRICS & GYNE-
COLOGY, April 1979, at 515, 516.
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mother felt that the recommended procedure was not in the best inter-
ests of the fetus, regardless of the degree of maternal invasion required
by the proposed treatment.' 77 The reasons for refusal in these circum-
stances might be religious beliefs, fear of harm to the fetus, or concern
over the possibility of salvaging a fetus whose prospects for a life worth
living are dismal.'
l7
Thus, a mother might refuse recommended fetal surgery for "unjus-
tifiable" reasons, for example, based upon an unreasonable fear of sur-
gery or a rejection of technology regardless of the potential benefit to
the fetus; however, her refusal might also be based upon more legiti-
mate grounds, for example, when the benefit of the proposed treatment
was uncertain. Therefore, adoption of the fetal view, which essentially
eliminates maternal input in fetal treatment decisions, is an unneces-
sary interference with the mother's right of parental autonomy. More-
over, since the fetal view would require a mother to consent to all
recommended fetal procedures, even those of disputed benefit, her
right to bodily integrity would be unreasonably burdened.
A second reason to reject the fetal view is that it tacitly approves a
"fundamental right to a healthy birth."' 7 9 Many commentators have
urged the recognition of a right to be born whole and healthy.,8" In
addition, a number of jurisdictions have based their decisions allowing
recovery for prenatal injuries on this right.' Although a right to be
born whole and healthy would seem to substantiate our societal con-
cem for the value and quality of human life, recognition of this right
has implications far beyond the goal of providing each child the best
possible start in life.'82 The difficulties inherent in a right to a healthy
birth have been well stated:
"[S]uch a principle ... misstates the relative rights and obligations
of physicians, parents, and progeny. [Tihe principle of a right to a
healthy birth is too far-reaching to establish a legal rule. The en-
forcement of such a rule by the state, through the courts and other
agencies of social control, would quickly lead to unprecedented eu-
genic totalitarianism."' 83
177. See Ruddick & Wilcox, supra note 3, at 11.
178. Id.
179. See, e.g., WILLIAMS OBSTETRICS, supra note 7, at 9; Ament, The Right to be Well Born, J.
LEGAL MED., Nov.-Dec. 1974, at 24; Grodin v. Grodin, 301 N.W.2d 869, 870 (Mich. App. 1981);
Davis, Ethicaland TechnicalAspects of Genetic Intervention, 285 NEw ENG. J. MED. September 30.
1971, at 800.
180. Id.
181. See Smith v. Brennan, 157 A.2d 497, 503 (N.J. 1960); Gleitman v. Cosgrove, 227 A.2d
689, 692 (N.J. 1967).
182. See Capron, The Continuing Wrong of "WrongfulLfe", in GENETICS AND THE LAW II 91
(A. Milunsky & G. Annas, eds. 1980).
183. Id.
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Thus, the problem with a fundamental right to a healthy birth lies in
the interpretation of "healthy."' 84  If all children must be born
"healthy," who is to decide what defects or abnormalities cannot be
allowed to exist?' 85
Furthermore, as previously noted, fetal surgery cannot cure all po-
tential defects and abnormalities. Implicit in the notion of a healthy
birth is a limit on parental options if the fetus is "defective." The
choices mandated by the requirement of a right to a healthy birth
would be limited to (1) surgical repair, if appropriate, or (2) abortion, if
surgery were not appropriate.'86
Moreover, since a right to a healthy birth would place a duty upon
mothers to employ all recommended fetal therapy, 8 7 a duty to discover
any potential defect would also arise. 88 Establishing a duty to discover
whether a treatable abnormality exists means nothing less than
mandatory prenatal care and mandatory screening of all pregnancies
184. See Turpin v. Sortini, 119 Cal. App. 3d 690, 696 n.3, 174 Cal. Rptr. 128, 132 (1981),rev'd
on other grounds, 31 Cal. 3d 220, 643 P.2d 954, 182 Cal. Rptr. 337 (1982); Becker v. Schwartz, 46
N.Y.2d 401, 405, 386 N.E.2d 807, 812; see also Motulsky, Governmental Responsibilities in Genetic
Diseases, in GENETICS AND THE LAW II 237, 237 (A. Milunsky & G. Annas, eds. 1980); Annas,
Righting the Wrong of 'WrongfulLife', 11 HASTINGS CENTER REP., 8, 9, February 1981.
185. See supra note 184. Another potential problem with legal recognition of a right to be
born whole and healthy might be a reliance on civil suits by a child against its mother. If a mother
could be sued for her conduct during pregnancy that resulted in harm to the fetus, a mother's
refusal to employ fetal surgery could serve as a basis for liability. The possibility of a child suing
its mother for her prenatal conduct was suggested by the court in the case of Curlender v. Bio-
Sciences Laboratories, 106 Cal. App. 3d 811, 816, 165 Cal. Rptr. 477, 481 (1980). In addition, one
case has been reported in which a child was allowed to state a cause of action against a mother for
her allegedly negligent conduct during pregnancy. See Grodin v. Grodin, 301 N.W.2d 869, 871
(Mich. App. 1981) (child's permanent teeth brown and discolored as a result of mother's use of the
drug Tetracycline during pregnancy). Although Grodin arose in Michigan, the court's suggestion
in Curlender could serve as authority for a case like Grodin in California. This type of suit would
not be barred by intrafamilial tort immunity since that doctrine has been abolished in California.
See Gibson v. Gibson, 3 Cal. 3d 914, 916, 923, 479 P.2d 648, 648, 654, 92 Cal. Rptr. 288, 288, 294
(1971). There is statutory authority, however, that can be cited as prohibiting civil suits by a child
against its mother for her prenatal conduct. California Civil Code section 43.6 provides: "no
cause of action arises against a parent of a child based upon the claim that the child should not
have been conceived, or, if conceived, should not have been allowed to have been born alive."
This section has been construed as eliminating any cause of action by a child that would en-
courage parents to choose abortion rather than risk liability for giving birth to a "less than perfect
child," See Turpin v. Sortini, 31 Cal. 3d 220, 229, 643 P.2d 954, 959, 182 Cal. Rptr. 337, 345
(1982). The possibility of a civil suit by the child against a mother for failing to employ fetal
surgery would definitely tend to encourage abortion as a simpler solution to a conflict over recom-
mended fetal therapy. This would be especially true if the recommended fetal therapy required a
highly invasive procedure on the mother. Accordingly, civil suits against the mother for failure to
employ fetal therapy should be prohibited under section 43.6.
186. See supra note 184.
187. See Robertson, supra note 19, at 352; Shaw, The Potential Plaintio," Preconception and
Prenatal Torts, in GENETICS AND THE LAW II 225, 228 (A. Milunsky & G. Annas, eds. 1980); see
generally Comment, Parental Liabilityfor Prenatal Injury, 14 COLUM. J.L. SoC. PROBS. 47 (1978);
Comment, Recovery for Prenatal Injuries: The Right of a ChildAgainst its Mother, X SUFFOLK
U.L. REV. 582 (1976).
188. See Robertson, supra note 19, at 352-53. One California court and several commentators
have suggested that a duty to discover potential fetal problems already exists. 106 Cal. App. 3d
811, 829, 165 Cal. Rptr. 477, 488 (1980). See Shaw, supra note 187, at 228-29.
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for fetal abnormalities.' 89 Although mandatory prenatal care, includ-
ing screening and treatment of every pregnancy, may be a legitimate
goal of society, this is a decision that properly belongs to the legislature
as the chosen representative of society.' 0 A judicially created duty to
discover potential birth defects would probably meet with great resist-
ance. The cost alone would surely lead to massive non-compliance.' 91
Even if the legislature were to enact mandatory prenatal care and
screening laws, formidable problems would remain. First, screening all
pregnancies using amniocentesis and ultrasound in order to detect pos-
sible fetal abnormalities is currently not standard medical practice.
The risks of the procedures do not outweigh the benefits to be gained
by routinely testing all pregnant women.' 92  Second, screening only
medically indicated pregnancies 93 would not reveal all treatable de-
fects. Some defects are not amenable to prenatal diagnosis by any
technique.194
Finally, mandatory prenatal care, as a means of preventing birth de-
fects, would require inordinate state intrusion into the lives of pregnant
women, and could lead to a serious deprivation of liberty. 195 Women
could be required to take medications to maintain their own health and
could be prohibited from using alcohol or other substances that might
pose a threat to the developing fetus.'96 State regulation of a mother's
life during pregnancy might extend to the nature of her work, her diet,
189. See Robertson, supra note 19, at 360. For an example of a prenatal screening program,
see Crandall, Robertson, Lebherz, King & Schroth, Maternal Serum a -Fetoprotein Screeningfor
the Detection of Neural Tube Defects-Report of a Pilot Program, 138 WESTERN J. MED. 524-30
(April 1983).
190. 410 U.S. 113, Doe v. Bolton, 410 U.S. 179, 222 (1973) (Rehnquist, 1. and White, J., dis-
senting) "a sensitive area such as this, involving as it does issues over which reasonable men may
easily and heatedly differ ... should be left with the people and to the political processes the
people have devised to govern their affairs."
191. See generally Motulsky, Governmental Responsibilities in Genetic Diseases, in GENETICS
AND THE LAW II 237, 246 (A. Milunsky & G. Annas, eds. 1980).
192. See Friedman, supra note 3, at 111. The three major risks of amniocentesis are the fol-
lowing: (1) trauma to the fetus, to the placenta or less often, to the umbilical cord or maternal
structures, (2) infection, (3) abortion or premature labor. Risk of fetal loss is placed at between 2.6
- 3.5% as compared to a control of 1.1 - 3.2%. WILLIAMS OBSTETRICS, supra note 7, at 330-34.
193. For example, the medical indications for amniocentesis are (1) advanced maternal age
(35 or over); (2) previous pregnancy resulted in birth of a child with a chromosomal abnormality;
(3) family history of genetic disease. WILLIAMS OBSTETRIcs, supra note 7, at 338-44.
194. Id.
195. See Annas, Forced Cesareans. The Most Unkindest Cut of All, 12 HASTINGS CENTER
REP. June 1982 at 16, 45; Annas, Righting the Wrong of'Wrongful Life', 11 HASTINGS CENTER
REP., February 1981, at 8, 9.
196. See Annas, Forced Cesareans, supra note 195, at 45; Robertson, supra note 19, at 358.
See, e.g., N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 27, 1983, at 11, col. 4. A physician in Baltimore has petitioned the
Juvenile court in an effort to force a pregnant woman to stop taking drugs. The complaint con-
tends that the mother's drug abuse, described as the use of substantial amounts of Quaalude,
Valium, Cocaine, and morphine, has retarded the growth of the 7-month old fetus, and placed
both her life and the life of the unborn child in dangerous life-threatening situations.
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and even her personal habits. 197 Although these measures might be
motivated by a legitimate purpose, the potential for abuse is too
great. 198
As demonstrated, the fetal view would pose an unnecessary burden
on a mother's rights of parental autonomy, bodily integrity, and indi-
vidual liberty. The fetal right to necessary medical care does not re-
quire depriving the mother of all authority to make medical care
decisions for the fetus. Indeed, the fetal view raises a specter of intru-
sive state regulation that has been consistently shunned by our
society. 199
If the fetal view represents one extreme position in the matter of fetal
treatment conflicts, the maternal view represents the other extreme.
The maternal view would be advocated by those who resent any state
interference with parental decisions about medical care for children.2"
An analysis of the maternal view, however, will reveal that it does not
go far enough in protecting the right of the fetus to medical care or the
interest of the state in assuring the protection of that right.
B. The Maternal View
The maternal view of balancing the interests involved in a conflict
over fetal treatment would give paramount importance to the mother's
rights of bodily integrity and parental autonomy.20' This approach
would allow the mother an absolute right to choose whether or not the
fetus should become a patient at all. Fetal treatment would be author-
ized only with the mother's informed consent. 20 2 A number of com-
mentators see this approach as the only appropriate option.2 °3
Allowing the mother complete control, however, is inconsistent with
the fetal right to medical care authorized by California law,2" and
would prohibit the state from exercising its duty to protect the health of
the unborn.20 5 Moreover, judicial precedents already exist that reject
an absolute right of choice in the mother.
In particular, the United States Supreme Court has limited a
mother's right to choose abortion once the fetus has become viable.20 6
197. Id.
198. See Annas, Righting the Wrong, supra note 195, at 9.
199. See generally Henkin, Privacy and Autonomy, 74 COLUM. L. REv., 1410, 1410-21 (1974).
200. See, e.g., Hubbard, The Fetus as Patient, Ms. MAGAZINE, October 1982, at 28, 32.
201. Ruddick & Wilcox, supra note 3, at 12.
202. Id.
203. See Fletcher, The Fetus as Patient: Ethical Issues, 246 J. AM. MED. A. 772, 772 (1981);
Shriner, Maternal Versus Fetal Rights-A Clinical Dilemma; OBSTmRics & GYNECOLOGY, April
1979, at 518, 519; Annas, Forced Cesareans, supra note 158, at 45.
204. See supra notes 81-105 and accompanying text.
205. See supra notes 113-19 and accompanying text.
206. 410 U.S. at 163 (1973).
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The Court has declared that the state may prohibit abortion after via-
bility has been reached. 0 7 Furthermore, several cases have already ap-
proved surgical procedures on the mother to save the life of her unborn
child.208
In the case of Raleigh Fitkin-Paul Morgan Memorial Hospital v. An-
derson,209 a Jehovah's Witness refused a blood transfusion recom-
mended to save both her life and the life of the fetus.210 The woman
subsequently left the hospital against medical advice so the question
became moot.2 1' Nevertheless, the Supreme Court of New Jersey de-
cided that the life of an unborn child is entitled to protection from the
state, and declared that the court would order whatever medical relief
was necessary to preserve fetal life.21 2 The value of this case as reliable
precedent is somewhat limited, however, because a blood transfusion is
a minimal surgical intervention 213 and the mother never was required
to submit to a transfusion. 4
The same position was taken by another court in a more recent case.
In Jefferson v. Grffln Spaulding County Hospital,1 5 the Supreme Court
of Georgia ordered a cesarean section and blood transfusions over the
religious objections of the mother who was 39 weeks pregnant.21 6 Med-
ical indication for the surgery was based upon a finding of complete
placenta previa 7.2 1  The court granted temporary custody of the child to
the state of Georgia declaring that interference with the mother's reli-
gious beliefs was outweighed by the duty of the state to protect "a liv-
ing, unborn human being."218
Finally, a case was reported in the medical literature concerning a
woman who refused a cesarean section recommended for severe fetal
distress because she feared the surgery.219 The mother was an in-
creased surgical risk because of excessive obesity.220 The court ap-
pointed attorneys for both mother and fetus and a hearing was held at
207. Id. at 163, 165.
208. See infra notes 209-22.
209. 201 A.2d 537 (1964).
210. Id. at 537-38.
211. Id. at 538.
212. Id.
213. See Annas, Forced Cesareans, supra note 195, at 17.
214. Id.
215. 274 S.E.2d 457 (Ga. 1981).
216. Id. at 458.
217. Placenta previa is a serious but rare complication of pregnancy in which the placenta, or
afterbirth, is implanted in the uterus so that it blocks the baby's entrance to the birth canal. Even
a simple vaginal exam can cause sudden, massive and even fatal hemorrhage. Cesarean section is
the accepted method of delivery in all cases of total placenta previa. See WILLIAMS OBSTETRICS,
supra note 7, at 508-10, 514.
218. 274 S.E.2d at 460.
219. See supra note 157, at 209.
220. Id. at 211.
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her bedside.22' The court declared the fetus to be a neglected and de-
pendent child under the Colorado Children's Code, and a cesarean sec-
tion was ordered to preserve its life.222
In the face of these precedents dealing specifically with the unborn
child,223 an absolute maternal right to make all medical decisions on
behalf of the fetus cannot be supported legally. Moreover, an absolute
maternal right of choice is inconsistent with the fetal right to medical
care authorized by California law,224 as well as the sovereign power of
the state to protect the health and welfare of the unborn. 2 2 5 Finally, the
interest of the state in promoting responsible private medical care deci-
sions would prohibit a strict maternal view as the basis for a standard.
Since the fetal view allows unwarranted interference with the mother's
rights, and the maternal view falls short in protecting fetal rights, a
qualified maternal view offers the only approach that can satisfactorily
protect the interests of all the parties involved.
C The Qualkfed Maternal View
Under the qualified maternal view, the fetus would be a provisional
patient. The mother would be permitted to make most fetal treatment
decisions; however, the state would be authorized to intervene, and the
fetal right to treatment would prevail, when the recommended treat-
ment would prevent serious irreversible harm to the fetus without pos-
ing serious risk to the mother's life. Accordingly, a mother's duty to
employ a recommended fetal therapy would not arise until the follow-
ing three conditions were met: (1) the mother chose to undergo a pre-
natal diagnostic test that was medically indicated according to current
standards of care; (2) the diagnostic test revealed the presence of a
treatable birth defect; and (3) the proposed treatment would prevent
serious irreversible physical or mental impairment to the fetus, would
pose no substantial risk to the mother's life, and offered the only rea-
sonable opportunity to correct the fetal problem.
Thus, the treatment proposed would have to be both a medically ac-
cepted procedure and one that offered a clear benefit to the fetus. The
"clear benefit" expected from this type of treatment would be similar to
221. Id. at 210. No written opinion was given by the court.
222. Id. These precedents compelling lifesaving fetal treatments have all involved normal
fetuses whose lives were threatened by external conditions. This must be distinguished from the
situation in which a fetal surgery would be recommended. All the conditions identified as amen-
able to fetal surgery involve fetuses that have either a developmental or genetic abnormality.
Consequently, a "quality of life" question often will be implicated in a conflict over fetal surgery.
223. See supra notes 209-22.
224. See supra notes 81-105 and accompanying text.
225. See supra notes 113-19 and accompanying text.
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the use of eye drops at birth to prevent blindness22 6 or fetal blood trans-
fusion to prevent severe mental retardation secondary to erythroblas-
tosis (RH incompatibility).227 An example of a fetal surgery that might
satisfy the proposed standard would be the implantation of a shunt to
alleviate hydrocephalus.228 The cranial abnormalities and mental re-
tardation caused by this condition are a direct result of the accumula-
tion of cerebrospinal fluid that retards brain growth.229 Implantation
of a shunt prevents pressure on the brain, thereby allowing normal
brain development to occur.2 3 ° Once this procedure becomes estab-
lished, it may offer the type of "clear benefit" encompassed within the
qualified maternal view.
Adoption of a standard based upon the qualified maternal view
would therefore avert the problems encountered by both the fetal and
maternal views previously discussed. In particular, the qualified mater-
nal view would prohibit state interference with a mother's right to pa-
rental autonomy unless clearly necessary for the benefit of the fetus. In
addition, it would eliminate a duty to discover fetal defects-a duty
that would lead to a serious invasion of the liberty of pregnant women.
This view also would guarantee that the right of the fetus to necessary
medical care would be protected. Finally, the interest of the state in
protecting society from unreasonable financial burdens would be satis-
fied by preventing, when possible, the kinds of fetal conditions that re-
quire lifetime institutional care.
Accordingly, under the qualified maternal view, the mother's right to
make fetal treatment decisions about any procedure not offering a clear
benefit to the fetus would be preserved. Furthermore, no mother
would be forced to consent to fetal therapy that would prolong or sal-
vage the life of a fetus whose prospects for a "life worth living" are
dismal. Treatments recommended in cases where the results were un-
certain or marginal would be performed only with the informed con-
sent of the mother. Since the mother bears the emotional burden of
caring for a severely defective child, she should have the authority to
make lifesaving treatment decisions that involve a judgment about the
quality of life.231 The California Supreme Court voiced its approval of
the right of parents to make quality of life decisions on behalf of the
226. See ANNIS, THE CHILD BEFORE BIRTH 129 (1978).
227. Id. at 87-90.
228. See Clewell, supra note 15, at 1320.
229. Id.
230. Id.
231. See Duff& Campbell, supra note 122, at 894; PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION FOR THE STUDY
OF ETHICAL PROBS. IN MED. AND BIOMEDICAL AND BEHAVIORAL RESEARCH, DECIDING TO
FOREGO LIFE-SUSTAINING TREATMENT, A REPORT ON THE ETHICAL, MEDICAL, AND LEGAL IS-
SUES IN TREATMENT DECISIONS 197, 223-27 (March 1983).
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fetus in the case of Turpin v. Sortini.232 Citing the California "right to
die" statute,233 the court declared that the public policy of the state
does not establish, as a matter of law, a preference for impaired life
over nonlife. 3 Moreover, the court indicated that, since the unborn
child is unable to make a choice as to the relative value of life, the law
generally accords the parents the right to make this decision.2 35
Balancing the rights and interests of mother, fetus, and state, there-
fore, reveals that the fetus must be considered a provisional patient.
The fetal right to independent recognition as a patient must be limited
to those treatments that are of clear benefit to the fetus. This limitation
on the legal rights of the fetus as a patient will not only circumvent the
problems inherent in the right to a healthy birth, but also will prevent
unnecessary intrusions on the mother's rights of parental autonomy
and bodily integrity. 36 Despite this limitation, however, the duty of
the state to protect the health of the unborn and preserve the public fisc
will be satisfied. Therefore, the following standard based upon the
qualified maternal view should be adopted.
JUDICIAL INTERVENTION IN FETAL TREATMENT
DECISIONS-A STANDARD
(1) The fetus is a provisional patient. The fetal right to medical
treatment will ordinarily arise only by consent of the mother. All fetal
treatment decisions will be made by the mother with full disclosure by
her physician of all treatment options and expected consequences, in-
cluding the expected consequences of no treatment at all.
(2) The mother has authority to make all fetal treatment decisions
involving procedures that would prolong or salvage a life of low
quality.
(3) The court will be authorized to intervene against the wishes of
the mother, however, if and only if. (a) the recommended fetal therapy
is established, proven, and would be a clear benefit to the fetus, (b) the
use of the particular fetal therapy would prevent significant irreversible
physical or mental impairment, (c) no less intrusive medical alternative
is available to prevent the impairment, and (d) the procedure would
not result in serious harm to the mother.
232. 31 Cal. 3d 220, 643 P.2d 954, 182 Cal. Rptr. 337 (1982).
233. CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE §7186.
234. 31 Cal. 3d at 233, 643 P.2d at 962, 182 Cal. Rptr. at 345 (1982).
235. Id.
236. See supra notes 55-77.
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CONCLUSION
The advent of fetal surgery has been greeted with enthusiasm be-
cause it offers a realistic potential to prevent debilitating birth defects.
This enthusiasm has been tempered, however, by a recognition of the
moral, ethical, and legal concerns associated with the availability of
this new technology. This comment has considered the legal issues sur-
rounding a conflict over recommended fetal therapy, and has con-
cluded that in certain situations a mother should have the 'right to
refuse. In order to define the circumstances in which a mother should
be allowed to refuse recommended fetal surgery, this comment has
identified the interests implicated when a conflict over fetal therapy
arises, including: (1) the right of the mother to make medical care deci-
sions on behalf of the fetus, and her right to avoid unwarranted bodily
intrusions; (2) the right of the fetus to legal recognition as a patient; and
(3) the dual interests of the state in safeguarding the health of the un-
born, and in promoting responsible private medical care decisions.
In order to protect the interests of mother, fetus, and state when a
conflict over fetal therapy does arise, this comment has demonstrated
that a standard for judicial intervention must be adopted. A standard
for judicial intervention that provides substantive guidelines clarifying
decisionmaking authority of the mother in fetal treatment conflicts will
accomplish several important objectives. These goals include reducing
the number of inconsistent judicial decisions and clarifying the role of
the physician. Accordingly, this comment has proposed a standard for
judicial intervention that characterizes the fetus as a provisional pa-
tient. Further, this standard grants the mother specific authority to re-
fuse recommended fetal therapy that would prolong or salvage a life of
low quality, or that would provide anything less than a "clear benefit"
to the fetus. The adoption of a standard for judicial intervention in
fetal treatment conflicts should go a long way toward enhancing the
potential benefits offered by fetal surgery.
Pela Lewis Hallisey
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